The proof theory of quasi-classical logic (QC logic) allows the derivation of non-trivializable classical inferences from inconsistent information. A non-trivializable, or paraconsistent, logic is, by necessity, a compromise, or weakening, of classical logic. The compromises on QC logic seem to be more appropriate than other paraconsistent logics for applications in computing. In particular, the connectives behave in a classical manner. Here we motivate the need for QC logic, present a proof theory, and semantics for the logic, and compare it to other paraconsistent logics.
Introduction
Intellectual activities usually involve reasoning with di erent perspectives. For example, consider negotiation, learning, or merging multiple opinions. Central to reasoning with di erent perspectives is the issue of handling inconsistencies. Maintaining absolute consistency is not always possible. Often it is not even desirable since this can unnecessarily constrain the intellectual activity, and can lead to the loss of important information. Indeed since the real-world forces us to work with inconsistencies, we should formalize some of the usually informal or extra-logical ways of responding to them. This is not necessarily done by eradicating inconsistencies, but rather by supplying logical rules specifying how we should act on them GH91, GH93] . In this way, we are moving away from a classical view of information being either true or false, to a view where we accept that we may have a number of perspectives on information and that these perspectives may contradict each other.
An important example of the need to reason with inconsistent information is in systems development. The development of most large and complex systems necessarily involves many people, each with their own perspectives on the system. Systems development therefore involves problems of identifying and handling inconsistencies between such perspectives. For this there is a need to tolerate inconsistencies, and more importantly to be able to act in a contextdependent way in response to inconsistency FGH + 94]. This is vital since in exible forcing of consistency can unnecessarily constrain the development process.
Paraconsistent reasoning is important in handling inconsistent information BdCGH97], and there have been a number of proposals for paraconsistent logics (for reviews see EGH95, CH97, Hun98b] ). However, developing nontrivializable, or paraconsistent logics, necessitates some compromise, or weakening, of classical logic. Key paraconsistent logics such as C ! dC74] achieve this by weakening the classical connectives, particularly negation. However this results in useful proof rules such as disjunctive syllogism failing, and intuitive equivalence such as : _ ! failing. For users of logic, such as software engineers, the migration from classical logic which might be familiar and intuitive, to a paraconsistent logic where classical connectives are weakened, could be di cult. An alternative, called quasi-classical logic (or QC logic), which we rst introduced in BH95], is to restrict the proof theory. In this restriction, compositional proof rules (for example, disjunction introduction) cannot be followed by decompositional rules (for example, resolution). Whilst this gives a logic that is weaker than classical logic, it does mean that the connectives behave classically. Furthermore, we argue that all the inferences from the logic and intuitive. We believe the logic is appealing for reasoning with inconsistencies arising in applications such as systems development HN98, HN97] , and more generally in information fusion CH97].
QC logic has been shown to have much potential in requirements engineering as it o ers appropriate reasoning in the presence of inconsistency, supporting continued requirements gathering, and it provides the basis of analytical techniques for localizing and categorizing inconsistencies HN97, HN98] .
The purpose of this paper is to develop the presentation and analysis of QC logic. In the next section, we provide some basic de nitions, and then in the following section, we discuss the essential idea behind QC logic. In subsequent sections, we provide a proof theory, semantics, and a comparison with other key paraconsistent logics.
Some basic de nitions 3 The essential idea of QC logic
We now consider the essential idea behind QC logic. We describe it using the resolution proof rule. Resolution, de ned as follows, can be applied to clauses to generate further clauses called resolvents. In this proof rule _ is a resolvent of _ and : _ . _ : _ _ Given a set of clauses as assumptions, each clause, in the assumptions, can be regarded as an argument, and each resolvent can be regarded as an argument. So for each clause in the assumptions, there is an argument from the assumptions. Similarly, for each resolvent , there is an argument from the assumptions.
Resolution can be regarded as a process of focusing arguments. So a resolvent is more focussed than the clause : _ . Similarly, for the pair of arguments _ and : _ , the resolvent _ is more focussed. In general, a clause is more focussed than a clause if Atoms( ) Atoms( ). Hence, as one or more applications of resolution decomposes a set of assumptions, it focuses the arguments from the assumptions. A useful property of resolution is that is a resolvent only if all the literals used in are literals used in the set of assumptions (assuming, of course, that resolution is the only proof rule used). This means that any resolvent, and hence any argument from the assumptions, is a non-trivial inference from the assumptions. This holds even if the set of assumptions is classically inconsistent. As a result, resolution can constitute the basis of useful paraconsistent reasoning.
QC logic is motivated by the need to handle arguments rather than the need to address issues of verisimilitude for given propositions. We are aiming for a logic of arguments in the \real-world" rather than a logic of truths in the \real-world". Before we consider this reasoning semantically, we will clarify the notion of an argument. So a model just contains reasons for/against arguments | though we defer, for a page, discussion of formulae more complicated than literals. Note, the de nition of a model incorporates no notion of truth or falsity. Note also, the notion of a reason for, or against, is binary. There is no way, in this framework, to say for example that there are n reasons for . Also there is no way to denote the relative strengths of the reasons for/against any argument.
Equivalently, we can regard a model as giving a notion of satis ability.
+ 2 X means is \satis able" in the model ? 2 X means : is \satis able" in the model + 6 2 X means is not \satis able" in the model ? 6 2 X means : is not \satis able" in the model
Since we can allow both an atom and its complement to be satis able, we have decoupled, at the level of the model, the link between a formula and its complement. In contrast, in a classical model, if a model satis es a literal, then it is forced to not satisfy the complement of the literal.
This semantics can also be regarded as giving four \truth values", called \Both", \True", \False", \Neither". For a literal , and its complement . The reason we need this de nition for disjunction that is more restricted than classical, is that we have decoupled the link between a formula and its negation in the model. Therefore, in order to provide a meaning for resolution, we need to put the link between each disjunct, and its complement, into the de nition for disjunction. As a result, to ensure a clause is satis able, we need to ensure that if necessary, every more focussed clause is also satis able. Strong satisfaction therefore provides a semantic account for paraconsistent reasoning using resolution. Given a set of clauses as assumptions, we can query using this paraconsistent reasoning system. So a query is satis ed if there is an argument for from the assumptions. However a query might be less focussed than the resolvents. For example, suppose _ is a query, and there is no argument from the assumptions for _ , though there is an argument for the more focussed formula . Here, it would be reasonable to allow disjunction introduction, de ned below, to be used to derive _ from the . In this way the query can be satis ed. _ However, for paraconsistent reasoning, disjunction introduction cannot be followed by further applications of resolution. Otherwise trivial inferences would follow from inconsistent information. For example, let be f ; : g. By disjunction introduction, _ is an inference. If resolution were allowed on this inference, then is an inference, which is a trivial inference.
Proofs in this paraconsistent reasoning are now two stage a airs. The rst is decompositional, forming resolvents from clauses using resolution. The second is compositional, forming clauses from the assumptions and resolvents, using disjunction introduction.
Since, arguments from assumptions are non-trivial inferences, then any disjunction incorporating an argument from assumptions as a disjunct, formed using disjunction introduction, is also non-trivial inference.
As a result of extending the proof theory, we also need to extend the semantics. First, we require the following de nition of weak satisfaction.
De nition 3. Weak satisfaction is weaker than strong satisfaction in that it does not incorporate focussing, and indeed seems closer to a classical notion of satisfaction.
In the following de nition, we can see that QC entailment is of the same form as classical entailment except we use strong satisfaction for the assumptions and weak satisfaction for the inference.
De nition 3.6 Let j = Q be an entailment relation such that j = Q }(L clauses ) L clauses , and de ned as follows, f 1 ; ::; n g j = Q i 8X(X j = s 1 and ::: and X j = s n implies X j = w )
We can consider the strong satisfaction relation as capturing the decomposition of the set of assumptions. Models are only acceptable to the strong satisfaction relation if they support focussing. Strong satisfaction forces each resolvent to hold of a clause _ if holds. In contrast, we can consider weak satisfaction relation as capturing the composition of formulae from resolvents, allowing disjuncts to be introduced. Example 3.5 Let = f g, where 2 A, and let X1 = f+ g and X2 = f+ ; ? g. Now X1 j = s , and X2 j = s , whereas X1 j = s _ , and X2 6 j = s _ . However, X1 j = w _ , and X2 j = w _ , and indeed j = Q _ . Example 3.6 Let = f _ ; : g, where ; 2 A. For all models X, if X j = s _ , and X j = s : , then X j = w . Hence, j = Q _ , j = Q : , and j = Q . Example 3.7 Let = f ; : g, where 2 A. For all models X, X j = s and X j = s : implies X j = w , X j = w : , and for any , X j = w _ , X j = w : _ . Hence, j = Q , j = Q : , j = Q _ , j = Q : _ , but 6 j = Q .
One rami cation of this de nition for QC proof theory and semantics is that in general classical tautologies do not hold.
Example 3.8 Let = ;. Hence X = ; is a model that strongly satis es all the formulae in , but j = Q _ : does not hold.
If we consider formulae representing arguments, then _: means we have an argument for or an argument for : . But this should not hold for every proposition . Since for example, there are many topics for which one would have neither an argument for or against.
In general, the failure of excluded middle, and other tautologies, is not a problem in applications. Consider software engineers using logic for reasoning about some speci cation. Here tautologies tell them nothing useful for their task.
To summarize, given a set of clauses, as assumptions, a set of resolvents of those clauses can be formed by repeated application of resolution, and this set of inferences is such that each element is non-trivial, and hence (potentially) useful. This idea can be extended to allow disjunction introduction as a proof rule, as long as it is not followed by a further application of resolution. These proof rules hold in classical logic, but the logic is weaker than classical logic. In particular, ex falso quodlibet, de ned as follows, does not hold.
:
The proof theory and semantics presented in this section is the basis of QC logic. Each formula in the language represents an argument, the proof theory is for deriving further arguments from a set of arguments, and the semantics captures satisfaction in terms of the existence of reasons for and against atomic arguments. In the following sections, we provide the full de nitions for the proof theory and the semantics, and analyse the resulting logic.
Full proof theory for QC logic
In the previous section, we presented the essential idea behind QC logic. Here, we develop the proof theory and semantics so that the logic can handle any set of formulae as assumptions and any formula as query.
QC proof rules
The QC proof theory is presented as a set of decomposition rules and a set of composition rules below. The decomposition rules apply to the assumptions and the composition rules apply to the query. All the QC proof rules hold in classical logic, but it is weaker than classical logic.
De nition 4.1 The following are the QC decomposition rules. In these proof rules, disjuncts can be void 1 | so for example for negation elimination, if we have :: as a premise, so that the disjunct is void, then we can obtain as a consequent. 
The decomposition rules allow clauses to be formed from formulae of the full language by eliminating connectives. The composition rules allow formulae of the full language to be formed from clauses by introducing connectives. We explain this more fully below.
QC proofs
QC logic is used by providing any set of classical formulae (ie. any L) as assumptions, and any classical formula (ie. any 2 L) as a query. De nition 4.3 T is a decomposition tree i T is a tree where each node is an element of L, and any node, that is not a leaf, is derived by the application of any QC decomposition rule. For any such node, each parent is a premise of the decomposition rule.
De nition 4.4 Let 2 }(L). For a clause , there is a decomposition of from i there is a decomposition tree, where each leaf is an element of , and the root is . Proof Assume 2 Clauses(f g). So , there is a such that is a CNF of and is a conjunct of . Now, is obtained by a sequence of applications of rewrites. Let us consider this rewrite process as the construction of a tree, called a CNF tree, that is de ned as follows: Each application of g is a recursive step since each call to g on a conjunction is a call to f on each conjunct.
A CNF tree is obtained by repeatedly and exhaustively applying f and g. Each node denotes a formula. Each step f(X) = Y is represented by an arc (X; Y ) in the tree and each step g(X) = f(Y )^f(Z) is represented by a bifurcation in the tree with a pair of arcs (X; Y ) and (X; Z). There is a one-toone correspondence between the sequence of steps and the sequence of nodes. Each leaf of the tree is a clause, and the conjunction of the leaves is a formula that is a CNF of the formula at the root.
In the same way, a QC decomposition (excluding use of resolution) can be de ned in terms of f and the function g 0 given below. Let g 0 : L ?! L be a function de ned as g 0 (X^Y ) = f(X), where f(X) = X when X is a conjunction or a literal. For example, g 0 (:: ^ ) = f(:: ). Each application of g 0 is also a recursive step since each call to g 0 on a conjunction is a call to f on one of the conjuncts.
A QC decomposition tree is obtained by repeatedly and exhaustively applying f and g 0 . Each node denotes a formula. Each step f(X) = Y is represented by an arc (Y; X) in the tree and each step g 0 (X) = f(Y ) is represented an arc (Y; X) in the tree. There is a one-to-one correspondence between the sequence of steps and the sequence of nodes. Each leaf is a clause.
Clearly, for any CNF tree, we can form a QC decomposition tree by taking one branch from root to leaf inclusive, and reversing the direction of the arcs.
So if 2 Clauses(f g), there is a CNF tree where the root is , and a leaf is , and therefore there is a QC decomposition tree where the root is , and the leaf is . The following result means that in general there are no classical tautologies that hold for the empty database for the`Q relation.
Proposition 4.5 For = ;, there are no 2 L such that `Q Proof Assume = ;. Also assume 9 2 L such that `Q . Therefore either (option 1) there is a composition of from ; or (option 2) there is a 1 such that there is a decomposition of 1 from ;, and ...., and there is a n such that there is a decomposition of n from ;, and there is a composition of from f 1 ; :::; n g. Now, (option 1) cannot hold because there are no composition proof rules that hold for an empty premise list. Similarly, (option 2) cannot hold because there are no decomposition rules that hold for an empty premise list.
Hence, there is no such that `Q , when = ;. 2 In Section 3, we presented QC logic as a logic of argumentation, rather than as a logic of \truths". We therefore believe that failure of classical tautologies to hold in QC logic is intuitive, in general. Though for non-empty sets of assumptions, there are classical tautologies that follow. For example, let = f g. So `Q _ : holds, and _ : is a classical tautology.
Clearly QC logic is paraconsistent according to the de nition in Section 1. We also have the following result that ensures the reasoning is non-trivial. Proof We show the proposition by showing Atoms( ) \ Atoms(f g) = ; implies 6 Q . We do this by contradiction. We assume Atoms( ) \ Atoms(f g) = ; and we also assume `Q . From the second assumption, by De nition 4.7, there exists 1 ; :::; n such that there is a decomposition of 1 from , and ..., and a decomposition of n from , and there is a composition of from f 1 ; ::; n g. Therefore one of the following two options hold: (option 1) 9 i 2 f 1 ; ::; n g such that Atoms( ) \ Atoms(f i g) = ;; or (option 2) Atoms( ) \ Atoms(f 1 ; ::; n g) = ;. If option 1 holds, there is a decomposition tree where each leaf is an element of , and the root is i . Furthermore, since Atoms( ) \ Atoms(f i g) = ;, there is a node in the decomposition tree where the conjunction of the parents of the node, denoted , is such that Atoms(f g)\Atoms(f g) = ;. But there is no decomposition rule with premises and consequent such that Atoms(f g)\Atoms(f g) = ;. Hence Even if we restrict consideration to a non-tautological inference that follows classically from a consistent set of formulae, we are not guaranteed that will also follow from the QC consequence relation. For example, let = f g. For Proof Construct Resolvents( ). There are a nite number of items in this set (Lemma 4.1), and each item can be determined by constructing a decomposition tree, and so there is a nite number of decomposition trees that can be formed, and each of these has a nite number of nodes (Lemma 4.2). The set of all roots of all these decomposition trees is therefore Resolvents( ). Since Resolvents( ) is nite, }(Resolvents( )) is nite, and so there is a nite number of composition trees that can be formed from subsets of Resolvents( ), and each of these has a nite number of nodes (Lemma 4.3). So, `Q holds i is a root of least one of these composition trees. Therefore, for any 2 }(L); 2 L, `Q or 6 Q can be determined in a nite number of steps. 2 We nish this section by including the following de nition and proposition that we will require later.
De nition 4.9 T is a normal decomposition tree i T is a decomposition tree and for each node that is derived by an application of resolution, every subsequent node is derived by resolution or disjunct contraction.
Proposition 4.9 For every decomposition tree T, where each leaf is an element of and the root is , there is a normal decomposition tree N, where each leaf is an element of and the root is .
Proof If T has only one leaf, then T involves no applications of resolution, and so N can be formed directly from T. Now, assume a decomposition tree T where the leaves are 1 ; ::; n , and the root is . From Proposition 4.1 for any 2 Resolvents( ), is also in Resolvents(Clauses( )). So we can form N with leaves 1 ; ::; n and root by de ning a subtree with leaves 1 ; ::; n and root such that this subtree only contains applications of resolution and disjunct contraction. We now form N from this subtree by de ning a branch from each leaf i to the node i such that each of these branches is a decomposition tree involving no application of resolution or disjunction contraction as demonstrated in the proof of Proposition 4.2. 2
Characterization of the QC consequence relation
We now consider properties of the consequence relation. These properties have been much discussed in the context of non-monotonic logics Gab85, GM93] and of relevance logics AB75, Ten84]. At the end of this section, we discuss the relevance to QC logic of these properties and associated results. Proposition 4.13 The property of or, de ned as follows, succeeds for the QC consequence relation, where 2 }(L), 2 L. f g`Q and f g`Q implies f _ g`Q Proof We consider the simple case where is a set of clauses, and ; ; are clauses. First assume we can obtain 2 Resolvents( f g) and 2
Resolvents( f g). Therefore _ 2 Resolvents( f _ g). As a result _ 2 Resolvents( f _ g). By disjunct contraction, we obtain f _ g`Q . Generalizing to any 2 }(L) and any ; ; 2 L is straightforward. 2 Proposition 4.14 The property of consistency preservation succeeds for the
We summarize the properties of the QC consequence relation in Table 1 . There is some debate over the minimal properties that a consequence relation should support. There are proposals that the minimal properties should be re exivity, transitivity (cut), and monotonicity (see for example Tar56]). However, to support some forms of non-classical reasoning, some compromise on these properties needs to be made. For non-monotonic reasoning | a form of reasoning with information that is in some sense inconsistent BH97] | involves compromising on monotonicity Gab85]. However, this compromise results in other properties also being compromised. There are many choices over which combinations of properties can be supported for non-monotonic reasoning Mak94] .
The properties of re exivity and monotonicity hold for the QC consequence relation. However, the property of cut fails for the QC consequence relation, because to ensure non-trivial reasoning, decomposition rules cannot be applied after composition rules in a proof. This means that proofs cannot be composed to give longer proofs, and so we can only view inference as a one-step process, not an interative process. The rejection of cut (transitivity) has also been examined for relevance logics as a solution to the problem of Lewis' paradoxes:
The rst paradox concerns the irrelevancy arising from ex falso quodlibet. The second paradox concerns the irrelevancy arising from the tautology on the right hand side holding irrespective of the assumptions on the left hand side.
In classical logic, the rst paradox can hold because we can obtain _ from by disjunct introduction, and then by disjunctive syllogism. Recognizing this, Anderson and Belnap, who were keen to retain transitivity, suggested the rejection of disjunctive syllogism AB75]. Later Tennant Ten84] suggested the retention of disjunctive syllogism, and the rejection of transitivity.
Tennant's paraconsistent logic is a restriction of the classical system of natural deduction: Classical proofs are restricted so as to prohibit applications of ex falso quodlibet. This gives a system in which (1) the Lewis paradoxes do not hold; (2) every unsatis able set of sentences can be shown to be inconsistent by the logic; (3) all non-tautological classical consequences of a set of sentences are provable in the logic; and (4) transitivity fails only when the combined assumptions form an inconsistent set.
There is a clear similarity between Tennant's paraconsistent logic and QC logic. Though, an immediate di erence is that tautologies, such as _ : , follow from the empty set using Tennant's logic whereas no tautologies hold for QC logic.
Other properties that fail for the QC consequence relation include supraclassicality, conditionalization, deduction, right weakening, and left logical equivalence. These failures are substantially due to classical tautologies not holding in general for QC logic. We compare QC logic with further paraconsistent logics in Section 8.
Full semantics for QC logic
We now extend the semantics presented in Section 3. Proof Assume X j = w _ ( ^ ). So X j = w or (X j = w and X j = w ). By distributivity of the classical connectives \or" and \and", we have (X j = w or X j = w ) and (X j = w or X j = w ). Hence. X j = w ( _ )^( _ ). The rest of the proposition follows similarly. 2 We now show QC proof theory is sound. Proof First form Resolvents( ). Since resolution can be applied at most n=2 times, where n is the number of disjuncts in the set of clauses, this takes time linear in n. Now make a disjunct in each clause in Resolvents( ) hold in the model. Since, there at most n clauses Resolvents( ), this also takes time linear in n. 2. 6 Comparison with other approaches QC logic exhibits the nice feature that no attention needs to be paid to a special form that the formulae in a set of premises should have, as long as each formula in the set is individually consistent and not a tautology. This is in contrast with other paraconsistent logics where two formulae identical by de nition of a connective in classical logic may not yield the same set of conclusions. From an example given earlier in this paper, in QC logic, is a conclusion of both f(: ! ); : g and f _ ; : g. QC logic is much better behaved in this respect than other paraconsistent logics.
In this section, we compare QC logic with C ! logic and four-valued logic. Below we give a presentation of C ! which was proposed da Costa dC74] . All the schema in the logic C ! are schema in classical logic.
De nition 6.1 The logic C ! is de ned by the following axiom schema together with the modus ponens proof rule.
_ : :: ! As with QC logic, the properties of re exivity, and, consistency preservation, or, and monotonicity hold for the C ! relation. However, cut, conditionalization, and deduction, also hold for C ! Hun96b]. For both QC and C ! , supraclassicality, left logical equivalence, and right weakening fail.
The four-valued logic of Belnap Bel77] provides an interesting alternative to C ! in that it has an illuminating and intuitive semantic characterization to complement its proof theory. We just provide the proof theory here.
De nition 6.2 The language for four-valued logic is a subset of classical logic. Let P be the usual set of formulae of classical logic that is formed using the connectives :;^and _. Then the set of formulae of the language, denoted Q, is P f ! j ; 2 Pg, and hence implication is not nestable. De nition 6. As with QC logic, re exivity, consistency preservation, and monotonicity hold for the four-valued consequence relation Hun96b]. In addition, cut holds for four-valued logic. However, four-valued logic does not adhere to and, supraclassicality, or, left logicial equivalence, deduction, conditionalization, or right weakening.
The QC consequence relation o ers many more non-tautological inferences from data than either the weakly-negative or four-valued logics. For example, via disjunctive syllogism, QC logic gives from f: ; _ g, whereas neither the weakly-negative logic C ! nor four-valued logic gives . This proposition follows from the classical tautologies from the empty set not being derivable in QC logic. However, if we exclude consideration of these tautologies, then we see that QC logic is stronger than C ! . QC logic can also be more appropriate than various approaches to reasoning from consistent subsets of inconsistent sets of formulae (for example consistencybased logics BDP93, EGH95] and truth maintenance systems Doy79, Kle86, MS88]). In particular, QC logic does not su er from the limitation due to spliting sets of formulae into compatible subsets: QC logic can make use of the contents of the formulas without being constrained by a consistency check. Moreover, it is obviously an advantage of QC logic to dispense with the costly consistency checks that are needed in all approaches to reasoning from consistent subsets.
Whilst QC logic constitutes an interesting alternative to other paraconsistent logics for practical applications, the compromises include tautologies from an empty set of assumptions being non-derivable, (though this is not usually a problem for applications), and at the meta-level, ie at the level of the consequence relation, some classical properties, including transitivity, do not hold.
Discussion
Developing a non-trivializable, or paraconsistent logic, necessitates some compromise, or weakening, of classical logic. The compromises imposed to give QC logic seem to be more appropriate than other paraconsistent logics for applications in computing. QC logic provides a means to obtain all the non-trivial resolvents from a set of formulae, without the problem of trivial clauses also following.
QC logic is being developed for applications | in particular, for reasoning about requirements speci cations that might be inconsistent HN98, HN97], and for merging expert opinions in knowledge-based systems Hun98a]. We aim to develop supporting technology for QC logic. So far we have speci ed an automated reasoning system based on the semantic tableau approach Hun96a].
QC logic may also o er an interesting alternative to classical logic in nonmonotonic reasoning. Consider default logic with a default theory (D; W). Here the default rules in D are used to extend the classical reasoning from W under a proviso that the extension is consistent. Now, if QC reasoning is used, instead of classical reasoning, then an alternative mechanism and interpretation of default reasoning is possible.
De nition 7.2 The following are the QC composition rules. We assume that conjunction and disjunction are commutative and associative. :( _ )
